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Lea	Ypi	
London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science	
Forthcoming	in	Kantian	Review	
	
	
From	Revelation	to	Revolution:		
The	Critique	of	Religion	in	Kant	and	Marx		
	
	
	
	
1. On	religion	in	Kant	and	Marx	
	Marx’s	best-known	slogan	concerning	the	role	of	religion	in	society	is	that	it	provides	“the	opium	 of	 the	 people”	 (Marx	 1844:	 72).	 For	 Kant,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 “morality	 leads	necessarily	 to	 religion”	 (R,	 6:	 8).	 1	 In	 the	 first	 case,	 the	 route	 to	 authentic	 human	emancipation	seems	to	require	the	abolition	of	religion.	In	the	second	case,	the	very	belief	in	 human	 emancipation	 seems	 indissolubly	 tied	 to	 its	 endorsement.	 Kant	 seems	 to	provide	 the	most	compelling	 justification	of	 religion;	Marx	offers	 the	most	compelling	rejection	of	it.	The	first	seems	to	be	a	deist.	The	second	is	an	atheist.	What	could	their	treatment	of	religion	have	in	common?			 There	 is	 plenty	 of	 textual	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 reading	 Kant’s	 and	 Marx’s	analysis	 of	 religion	 alongside	 each	 other	 is	 only	 useful	 to	 highlight	 the	 differences	between	 the	 former’s	 textbook	 idealism	and	 the	 latter’s	 textbook	materialism.	On	 the	surface,	Marx’s	 critique	 of	 religion	 reads	 like	 a	 direct	 confutation	 of	 Kant’s	 argument	about	the	necessity	of	practical	faith,	a	mockery	of	the	comforting	role	that	Kant	seems	to	assign	to	it,	within	the	limits	of	reason.	It	is	therefore	not	surprising	to	see	that,	to	the	extent	 that	 scholarly	 literature	 has	 found	 it	worthwhile	 to	 engage	with	 a	 comparison	between	the	two	authors,	the	treatment	of	religion	has	often	stood	out	as	an	example	of	
																																																						1	Immanuel	Kant,	Religion	within	the	Boundaries	of	Mere	Reason	and	Other	Writings	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	[1793]	1998)	p.60,	VI:	8,	from	now	on	abbreviated	as	R.	
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where	 reconciliation	 is	 beyond	 reach.2	 In	 this	 paper,	 I	 want	 to	 question	 that	interpretation.	I	want	to	argue	that	Marx’s	attitude	towards	the	role	of	practical	faith	is	much	more	 ambiguous	 than	 the	dominant	 trend	 suggests.	And	 I	want	 to	 suggest	 that	Kant’s	critique	of	religion	in	the	very	text	that	is	supposed	to	justify	its	role,	has	much	more	radical		implications	than	it	is	usually	given	credit	for.		While	significant	differences	between	the	outlook	of	the	two	authors	are	obviously	difficult	to	dismiss	(and	I	will	say	more	on	that	 towards	 the	end	of	 the	paper)	my	hope	 is	 that	reading	 their	analyses	of	religion	alongside	each	other	contributes	to	a	more	thorough	appreciation	of	the	political	implications	of	Kant’s	thoughts	on	religion	and	their	influence	in	the	subsequent	German	idealist	tradition.	It	is	also	important	to	critically	interrogate	and	put	pressure	on	those	readings	 of	 Marx	 that	 have	 emphasised	 the	 weight	 of	 historical	 materialism	 at	 the	expense	of	a	more	careful	analysis	of	the	moral	assumptions	that	underpin	his	interest	in	human	emancipation.3	The	reception	of	Kant’s	and	Marx’s	respective	claims	on	religion	by	established	authorities	 is	 a	 useful	 entry	 point	 to	 the	 intricacies	 of	 this	 debate.	 As	 is	well-known,	
Religion	within	the	limits	of	reason	alone	was	judged	by	the	Prussian	censors	a	text	that	misused	philosophy	to	“distort	and	disparage	many	of	the	cardinal	and	basic	teachings	of	the	 Holy	 Scripture	 and	 of	 Christianity”.	 Kant,	 whose	 reputation	 was	 by	 then	 well-established,	was	warned	to	expect	“unpleasant	measures”	for	his	“continuing	obstinacy”.4	In	the	case	of	a	very	young	Marx,	there	was	more	than	a	warning	threat.	The	treatment	of	religion	in	his	doctoral	thesis,	including	the	endorsement	of	Prometheus’s	proclamation	“I	detest	all	the	gods”	in	its	Preface,	cost	him	the	pursuit	of	an	academic	career	(McLellan	1987:	9).	Elsewhere	I	have	discussed	in	greater	detail	 the	historical	 links	between	the	writings	of	Marx	and	Kant,	 including	 the	extent	 to	which	 the	 thought	of	 the	 former	 is	influenced	by	the	latter,	both	directly	and	in	a	shape	mediated	by	Hegel’s	philosophy	(Ypi	2-14).	In	this	paper,	I	am	interested	in	both	what	grounds	and	what	follows	from	their	critical	 engagement	with	 traditional	 thinking	 about	 religion.	My	 argument	 is	 that	 the	critique	of	religion	in	both	Kant	and	Marx	is	linked	to	an	attempt	to	supersede	dogmatic	faith,	 and	 its	 reliance	 on	 revealed	 religion,	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 form	 of	 practical	 faith	
																																																						2	See,	 for	example,	Howard	Williams’s	paper	 in	 this	 issue.	But	see	also,	 for	a	contrasting	 interpretation,	which	highlights	the	affinities	between	the	two	authors	and	from	which	I	have	much	learned	Yovel	(1980).		3	For	more	criticism	of	these	readings	see	also	Suzanne	Love’s	paper	in	this	issue.	4	See	the	text	of	the	letter	published	in	Immanuel	Kant,	"The	Conflict	of	the	Faculties,"	(hereafter	CF)	in	
Religion	 and	 Rational	 Theology,	 ed.	 Allen	 W.	 Wood	 and	 George	 Di	 Giovanni	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	University	Press,	[1798]	2001),	p.	240,	VII:7.	
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culminating	in	a	revolution	in	(for	Kant)	moral	and	(for	Marx)	political	attitudes.	By	active	faith	I	mean	a	form	of	faith	embedded	in	historical	efforts	to	construct	a	universal	ethical	community	 as	 the	 condition	 of	 possibility	 for	 the	 achievement	 of	 full	 human	emancipation	 and	 the	 realisation	 of	 the	 highest	 good	 in	 the	 world.5	 By	 human	emancipation	 I	 mean	 the	 historical,	 collective	 practice	 of	 progressively	 removing	obstacles	to	the	full	realisation	of	humanity’s	moral	potential.	As	we	shall	shortly	see,	the	greatest	difficulty	with	this	enterprise	concerns	the	nature	of	such	obstacles.	For	both	Kant	and	Marx,	they	are	irreducible	to	the	inimical	intervention	of	particular	inclinations	or	 the	 hostility	 of	 nature,	 but	 due	 to	 human	 voluntary	 choices	 and	 the	way	 they	 are	entrenched	in	particular	religious,	social	and	political	institutions.	This	is	the	challenge	to	which	Kant’s	and	Marx’s	analysis	of	religion	is	supposed	to	respond.	The	answer,	for	both,	lies	in	a	radical	reshaping	of	the	role	of	faith	and	its	subordination	to	a	thoroughly	human	emancipatory	project.	While	Kant’s	theory	remains	aspirational	and	in	some	way	reluctant	to	endorse	the	idea	that	such	a	project	can	ever	be	fully	realised	on	earth,	his	account	 is	 an	 important	point	 of	departure	 to	understand	what	 is	morally	 at	 stake	 in	Marx’s	much	more	explicitly	political	stance.				
2. The	critique	of	religious	authorities	
	Oddly	 enough,	 there	 is	 no	 better	 way	 to	 introduce	 the	 transition	 from	 revelation	 to	revolution	at	the	centre	of	my	analysis	of	religion,	than	returning	to	Marx’s	(in)famous	remarks	on	religion	as	the	opium	of	the	people.	What	seems	at	first	like	an	unambiguous	condemnation,	turns	out	to	be	a	more	nuanced	reflection	on	the	role	of	religion	in	a	world	that	has	not	yet	achieved	full	human	emancipation.	Religion,	Marx	argues,	is	at	the	same	time	a	reflection	of	that	world,	and	a	protest	against	it.	Or	to	put	it	differently,	religion	is	“the	self-consciousness	and	self-esteem	of	man	who	has	either	not	yet	won	through	to	himself	or	has	already	lost	himself	again”	(Marx	1843:	72).	
																																																						5	Kant’s	doctrine	of	 the	highest	good	 is,	 of	 course,	 controversial.	 I	 side	with	 those	authors	who	see	 the	concept	as	related	 to	a	practical	duty	 to	promote	 the	highest	good	 in	 the	world	and	who	defend	Kant’s	emphasis	on	a	secular	rather	than	theological	analysis	especially	 in	his	 later	writings.	For	an	 important	analysis	along	those	lines,	see	Reath	(1988),	and	also	Yovel	(1980).	For	a	recent	critique	that	emphasises	Kant’s	commitment	to	a	more	religious	interpretation,	see	Pasternack	(2017).	For	my	own	analysis	of	the	concept	see	Ypi	(2011).	
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	 Marx	 does	 not	 think	 of	 himself	 as	 having	 been	 the	 first	 to	 come	 up	 with	 this	criticism	 of	 religion.	 He	 sees	 it	 as	 a	 legacy	 of	 the	 German	 philosophical	 tradition	immediately	 preceding	 him,	 and	 he	 underscores	 the	 relevance	 of	 that	 philosophical	tradition	 by	 remarking	 that	 the	 criticism	 of	 religion	 is	 the	 first	 step	 towards	 a	more	general	critique	of	society,	it	is	“the	pre-requisite	to	all	criticism”	(ibid).	According	to	this	tradition,	Marx	reports,	“man	makes	religion,	religion	does	not	make	man”	(ibid.).	It	 is	well-known	that	Marx’s	remarks	here	are	strongly	influenced	by	those	of	Feuerbach,	and	that	in	mounting	this	critique	of	religion	Feuerbach	was	merely	offering	what	he	thought	was	the	most	plausible	interpretation	of	Hegel’s	phenomenology	of	spirit	in	the	process	of	 articulating	 the	 transition	 of	 human	 self-consciousness	 through	 different	 historical	stages.	 What	 is	 much	 less	 well-established	 is	 how	 both	 Feuerbach’s	 and	 Hegel’s	advancements	 would	 have	 been	 impossible	 without	 the	 radical	 shift	 in	 perspective	pioneered	by	Kant.	Let	me	explain.	For	Kant	 too,	 just	 like	 for	Marx	 in	 the	passage	 that	 I	 have	 cited,	 humans	make	religion,	 religion	 does	 not	make	 humans.	 Religion	 thrives	 in	 the	 tension	 between	 the	awareness	 of	 the	 human	 being	 as	 the	 sole	 source	 of	 moral	 worth	 and	 a	 realistic	assessment	 of	 obstacles	 to	 their	 full	 moral	 emancipation.	 Both	 historical	 religious	institutions	(in	Kant’s	terms	“religion	of	rogation”	or	“of	mere	cult”)	and	moral	religion	(“the	religion	of	good	life	conduct”)	have	their	roots	in	this	tension	(R:	6,	51).	Yet	the	way	they	combine	the	elements	of	protest	and	resignation	have	very	different	manifestations.	In	 the	 case	 of	 religions	 of	 cult,	when	 faced	with	 adversity,	 human	 beings	 turn	 to	 the	projection	 of	 God	 and	 ask	 for	 his	 assistance	 (grace)	 through	 the	 work	 of	 his	intermediaries.	The	human	being	imagines	a	world	in	which	“everything	is	again	made	good	through	the	intercession	of	someone	else	who	is	favoured	in	the	highest	degree”	and	 “transfers	 his	 conception	 of	 the	 human	 being	 (his	 faults	 included)	 over	 to	 the	Divinity”	(R:	6,	200).	Such	projection	to	God	of	the	answer	to	the	weaknesses	of	human	conduct	 constitutes,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 perceived	 powerlessness	 of	humans	in	the	process	of	realising	their	moral	goals.	The	comfort	provided	by	religion	expresses,	to	put	it	in	Marx’s	famous	words,	“the	sigh	of	the	oppressed	creature”,	“the	soul	of	soulless	circumstances”	(Marx	1844:	72).		Notwithstanding	this	diagnosis,	the	effect	of	historical	religious	institutions	on	the	face	of	such	declared	impotence	is	one	that	paralyses	action	even	further.	The	worry,	for	Kant,	is	that	faith	in	external	assistance	of	this	kind	cultivates	a	passive	attitude,	which	
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relies	on	institutional	intermediaries	and	so-called	representatives	of	God	to	compensate	for	 human	 lack	 of	 initiative.	 This	 merely	 consolidates	 institutional	 practices	 of	domination	that	promise	human	salvation	while	merely	stifling	the	active	search	of	the	good,	entrenching	“the	dominion	that	the	clergy	has	usurped	over	minds	by	pretending	to	have	exclusive	dominion	on	 the	means	of	 grace”	 (R,	6:	200).	 In	 light	of	 this,	Kant’s	critique	 of	 the	 hypocritical	 and	 reactionary	 nature	 of	 the	 religions	 of	mere	 cult	 is	 as	relentless	as	that	of	Marx.	No	efforts	at	human	emancipation	can	succeed	for	as	long	as	human	beings	hold	on	to	the	illusion	that	a	divine	will	can	compensate	for	the	weaknesses	and	 corruption	 of	 which	 they	 suffer.	 Such	 an	 attitude	 can	 only	 cultivate	 passive	submission	 to	 the	 constituted	 order,	 deference	 to	 authority	 and	 a	 hypocritical	subservience	 that	 undermines	 rather	 than	 reinforcing	 the	 promotion	 of	 autonomous	moral	ends.	“The	faith	of	a	religion	of	service”,	Kant	argues,	is	“a	slavish	and	mercenary	faith”	whereby	“actions	are	extracted	only	through	fear	or	hope,	the	kind	which	also	an	evil	human	being	can	perform”	(R,	6:	 .115).	Such	“lazy	and	timid	cast	of	mind	(in	both	morality	 and	 religion),	which	 has	 not	 least	 trust	 in	 itself	 and	waits	 for	 external	 help,	unharnesses	all	the	forces	of	a	human	being	and	renders	him	unworthy	even	of	this	help”	(R,	6:	57).	Marx’s	 critique	 of	 the	 comforting	nature	 of	 religion	 and	 its	 effects	 on	practical	action	takes	a	similar	form.	His	analysis	of	the	projection	of	properties	of	human	beings	to	God	reveals	the	same	tendency	to	try	and	identity	a	force	able	to	compensate	for	the	weaknesses	and	deficiencies	 that	are	all	 too	human.	For	Marx,	 in	 the	 “mist	enveloped	regions	 of	 the	 religious	 world	 […]	 the	 productions	 of	 the	 human	 brain	 appear	 as	independent	beings	endowed	with	life”	(Marx	1867:	473).	Yet	both	authors	are	sensitive	to	 the	context	 in	which	 this	 illusion	emerges,	and	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is,	 in	some	way,	a	necessary	one.	When	Kant	criticises	the	claims	of	a	historical	faith	which	is	attached	to	the	purely	practical	needs	of	reason,	he	argues	that	a	similar	link	is	“in	accordance	with	unavoidable	limitations	of	human	reason”	(R,	6:	115).	For	Marx,	the	epistemic	limitations	that	Kant	highlights	are	ultimately	dependent	on	social-structural	ones	–	a	point	to	which	I	 shall	 return.	 Yet	 he	 also	 understands	 that	 “it	 is	 necessary	 to	 give	 religious	 forces	 a	spiritual	 form	by	erecting	 them	 into	an	autonomous	power”	 against	 the	human	being	(Marx	1933:	548).	And	like	Kant	he	shows	appreciation	for	a	form	of	belief	that	moves	away	from	the	reverence	of	authorities	in	the	direction	of	practical	faith.		
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One	paradigmatic	example	of	the	overlap	is	their	analysis	of	Protestantism.	Marx	praises	Luther	for	having	planted	the	seeds	of	the	transition	from	a	religion	of	cults	to	a	religion	 of	 the	 heart.	 Luther,	 Marx	 argues,	 “removed	 the	 servitude	 of	 devotion	 by	replacing	it	by	the	servitude	of	conviction”	and	“even	though	Protestantism	was	not	the	true	solution,	it	formulated	the	problem	rightly”.	The	real	issue,	Marx	argues,	“was	now	no	longer	the	battle	of	the	layman	with	the	exterior	priest,	it	was	the	battle	with	his	own	interior	 priest,	 his	 priestly	 nature”	 (Marx	 1844:	 77).	 For	Marx,	 the	 greatest	 legacy	 of	Luther	and	the	Reformation	was	to	begin	a	revolution	in	the	mind,	which	liberated	human	beings	from	religious	deference	to	external	authorities.	But	Marx	is	also	aware	that	while	Luther	“destroyed	faith	in	authority”,	he	restored	“the	authority	of	faith”.	As	he	puts	it,	Luther	“turned	priests	into	laymen	by	turning	laymen	into	priests.	He	liberated	man	from	exterior	religiosity	by	making	man’s	inner	conscience	religious.	He	emancipated	the	body	from	chains	by	enchaining	the	heart”	(ibid.).			For	Kant	too,	the	shift	from	religion	as	subservience	to	external	authorities	to	a	form	of	practical	faith	that	follows	(rather	than	conditioning)	human	being’s	duty	to	act	in	 conformity	 with	 the	 moral	 law	 is	 an	 important	 step	 in	 the	 transition	 from	institutionalised	 to	 moral	 religion.	 And	 while	 it	 is	 certainly	 possible	 to	 trace	 certain	philosophical	affinities	between	Kant’s	 religion	of	 the	heart	and	Luther’s	 (see	Paulsen	(1900)	for	an	early	classical	discussion),	Kant	was	just	as	cautious	as	Marx	is	in	his	overall	assessment	 of	 Protestantism	 as	 an	 ecclesiastical	 faith	 and	 its	 contribution	 to	 this	transition.	The	protestant	church,	for	Kant,	stood	out	as	much	as	the	catholic	one	for	its	“narrowness”	 of	 mind	 when	 it	 protested	 against	 the	 latter’s	 claims	 to	 	 “universally	binding	faith”	while	“it	would	often	gladly	exercise	them	itself,	if	it	could”	(R,	6:	109).		As	one	scholar	has	recently	put	it,	“Kant’s	thought	has	little	in	common	with	the	narrowly	biblical	religion	of	Luther,	Calvin	and	Zwingli,	and	has	even	less	in	common	with	their	Augustinianism	 and	 their	 deprecation	 of	 human	 reason”,	 his	 was	more	 “the	 spirit	 of	Erasmus	and	Nicholas	of	Cusa	than	that	of	Luther	and	Calvin”	(Wood	1970:	1970).		It	might	be	tempting	to	argue	that	Marx’s	critique	might	apply	just	as	much	to	the	kind	of	moral	faith	that	Kant	carefully	defends	in	his	analysis	of	religion	as	it	does	to	a	protestant	religion	of	conviction	which	ultimately	enslaves	the	human	being	to	itself.		For	Marx	“religion	is	the	illusionary	sun	which	revolves	around	man,	as	long	as	he	does	not	revolve	around	himself”	(Marx	1844:	77).	Obviously,	Kant	never	went	as	far	as	the	young	Marx	to	articulate	a	demand	for	“the	abolition	of	religion”,	a	call	to	“give	up	the	illusions”	
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about	the	human	condition	as	“a	demand	to	give	up	a	condition	that	requires	illusion”	(Marx	1844:	72).	The	period	in	which	he	wrote	was	very	different	from	Marx’s	and	the	orientation	towards	political	action	that	pervades	Marx’s	writing	is	only	there	as	a	seed	in	Kant.	The	process	Kant	advocated	was	not	one	of	radical	abolition	but	a	call	for	slowly	abandoning	a	set	of	 irrational	beliefs	 for	a	more	rational	one	(something	to	which	the	mature	Marx	would	also	return).	But	no	one	has	done	more	 than	Kant	 to	pioneer	 the	Copernican	outlook	that	animates	Marx’s	critique	of	religion,	a	critique	which	is	in	turn	central	to	the	study	of	the	foundation	of	human	action	and	its	historical	implications.	Kant	initiated	 the	 kind	 of	 philosophical	 revolution	 that,	 starting	 with	 a	 radical	 critique	 of	institutionalised	 religion,	 culminates	with	 the	assertion	 that	 “for	man	 the	 root	 is	man	himself”	(Marx	1844:	77).	He	was	the	first	German	philosopher	to	insist	that	only	a	pure	faith	“based	entirely	on	reason	can	be	recognised	as	necessary”	(R,	6:	115)	and	is	able	to	contribute	to	the	task	of	moral	emancipation	that	practical	philosophy	has	taken	upon	itself.	He	also	explained	 that	 “on	 its	own,	morality	 in	no	way	needs	 religion	 (whether	objectively,	as	regards	willing,	or	subjectively,	as	regards	capability)”	(R,	6:	4).	And	while	Kant	 also	 recognises	 that	 historical	 religions	 contain	 a	 kernel	 of	 rational	 faith	 for	contingent	reasons,	and	“due	to	the	unavoidable	limitations	of	human	reason”,	he	also	alerts	his	readers	to	remain	aware	of	their	contingency.	The	appropriate	attitude	with	regard	to	historical	religions	is	therefore	to	interpret	them	as	carrying	“a	principle	for	continually	 coming	 closer	 to	 pure	 religious	 faith	 until	 finally	we	 can	 dispense	 of	 that	vehicle”	(R,	6:	4).	Since	revelation,	Kant	argues,	can	be	interpreted	to	include	“the	pure	religion	of	reason”,	it	is	plausible	to	“start	from	some	alleged	revelation	or	other”	and	“to	hold	fragments	of	this	revelation	as	a	historical	system,	up	to	moral	concepts,	and	see	whether	it	does	not	lead	back	to	the	same	pure	rational	system	of	religion”	(R,	6:	4).	This	defence	of	the	claim	that	institutionalised	religions	appear	to	have	a	rational	purpose	when	 assessed	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 humanity’s	 own	 needs	 and	 demands,	makes	 Kant	 the	 founding	 father	 of	 the	 German	 philosophical	 movement	 that	 Marx	celebrates	 for	 articulating	 a	 “radical”	 (in	 the	 sense	 of	 grasping	 the	 roots	 of	 an	 issue)	critique	of	religion	which	ends	with	the	doctrine	that	“man	is	the	highest	being	for	man”	(Marx	1844:	77).	Likewise,	Kant’s	contextualisation	of	the	point	and	purpose	of	religious	authorities	 in	 light	 of	 the	 limitations	 of	 human	 reason,	 helps	 us	 come	 to	 grips	with	 a	theme	of	foremost	importance	for	later	German	idealist	thought:	the	supersession	(or	to	
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put	it	with	Hegel,	the	Aufhebung)	of	religion	in	philosophy	and	the	role	of	active	virtue	in	promoting	that	transition.	It	is	to	this	latter	question,	that	I	would	now	like	to	turn.			
3.	Evil,	alienation	and	freedom			Kant’s	remarks	on	the	role	of	historical	religions	in	relation	to	the	development	of	a	pure	faith	of	 reason	 illuminates	what	 is	 at	 stake	 in	Marx’s	praise	 for	 the	 radical	 critique	of	religion	developed	by	the	more	progressive	strand	of	the	German	philosophical	tradition	immediately	preceding	him.	The	merit	of	Protestantism,	as	Marx	saw	 it,	had	been	 the	destruction	 of	 deference	 to	 institutionalised	 tradition	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 cultivating	 a	religion	of	the	heart,	an	internal	faith	in	God	with	no	need	for	external	mediation.	The	merit	of	German	philosophy	was	that	of	making	this	very	idea	of	God	a	function	of	the	needs	 and	 claims	 of	 humanity,	 its	 efforts	 to	 prioritise	 active	 virtue	 over	 the	 focus	 on	heavenly	grace.	As	Marx	put	it,	while	Protestantism	turned	all	 laymen	into	priests,	the	task	of	German	philosophy	was	to	“turn	all	priestly	Germans	into	men”,	to	“emancipate	the	people”	 (Marx	1844:	72).	For	him	 the	 radical	 critique	of	 religion	culminates	 in	an	emphasis	on	human	freedom	as	reflected	in	the	“categorical	imperative	to	overthrow	all	circumstances	in	which	man	is	humiliated,	enslaved,	abandoned,	and	despised”	(Ibid.).		 Let	us	bracket	for	a	moment	the	analysis	of	the	specific	form	that	this	critique	of	domination	takes	in	the	writings	of	Marx	to	focus	on	some	parallels	with	Kant’s	account	of	freedom.	Notice	how	for	Kant	too,	the	problem	of	religion	arises	in	the	context	of	an	analysis	of	human	freedom,	when	a	moral	human	being	starts	to	reflect	on	the	question	of	“what	sort	of	world	he	would	create,	were	this	in	his	power,	under	the	guidance	of	pure	practical	reason	(R,	6:	5).	This	idea	that	“every	human	being	ought	to	make	the	highest	possible	 good	 in	 the	world	 his	 own	 final	 end”	 is,	 Kant	 argues,	 an	 “objective-practical	proposition	 given	 through	 pure	 reason”	 (Ibid.).	 But	 the	 duty	 to	 realise	 the	 highest	possible	 good	 in	 the	world	 has	 to	 come	 to	 grips	with	 human	 being’s	 anthropological	propensity	to	perform	actions	that	are	“so	constituted	that	they	allow	the	interference	of	evil	maxims”	 (R,	 6:	 20).	This	propensity	 to	 evil	 and	 to	undermining	 the	 realisation	of	moral	dispositions	is	the	main	obstacle	to	humanity’s	moral	emancipation.	It	 is	 important	 to	 notice	 that	 the	 root	 of	what	Kant	 calls	 evil	 has	 emphatically	nothing	to	do	with	nature	understood	as	something	external	to	human	beings	but	rather	
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with	their	own	power	of	choice.	As	Kant	puts	it,	“the	ground	of	evil	cannot	lie	in	any	object	
determining	the	power	of	choice	through	inclination,	not	in	any	natural	impulses,	but	only	in	a	rule	that	the	power	of	choice	itself	produces	for	the	exercise	of	its	freedom”	(Ibid.).	Indeed,	Kant	insists,	it	would	be	futile	to	enquire	further	if	anything	other	than	human	being’s	own	capacity	to	adopt	particular	maxims	is	at	the	basis	of	this	choice	since	“if	this	ground	were	ultimately	no	longer	itself	a	maxim,	but	merely	a	natural	impulse,	the	entire	exercise	of	freedom	could	be	traced	back	to	a	determination	through	natural	causes	–	and	this	 would	 contradict	 freedom”	 (Ibid.).	 Therefore,	 the	 main	 obstacle	 to	 human	emancipation	and	the	realisation	of	the	highest	good	in	the	world,	the	propensity	to	evil	“can	only	attach	to	the	moral	faculty	of	choice”	(R,	6:	31).	Inclinations	might	only	make	more	“difficult	the	execution	of	good	maxims	opposing	them”	but	“genuine	evil	consists	in	 our	 will	 not	 to	 resist	 the	 inclinations	 when	 they	 invite	 transgression,	 and	 this	disposition	is	the	really	true	enemy”	(R,	6:	58).			 Acts	of	free	will	rather	than	natural	inclinations	are	therefore	the	prime	stumbling	block	to	human	emancipation	and	to	human	beings’	realisation	of	the	highest	good	in	the	world.	In	principle,	the	human	species	is	capable	to	set	and	pursue	moral	ends	that	earn	its	members	the	title	of	“titular	lord	of	nature”	and	put	them	at	the	centre	of	a	teleological	system	whereby	 the	 ends	 of	 nature	 are	 subordinated	 to	 their	moral	 purposes	 (CJ,	 5:	431).6	But	in	practice,	and	all	too	often,	the	decisions	humans	make	are	contrary	to	their	moral	vocation.	Evidence	of	such	a	corrupt	propensity	to	evil	is	provided	by	the	multitude	of	examples	“that	the	experience	of	human	deeds	parades	before	us”,	both	in	so-called	civilised	 societies	 and	 outside	 them.	 Unprovoked	 cruelty,	 falsity,	 hypocrisy,	 hostility	towards	each	other	all	suggest,	for	Kant,	that	“we	shall	have	enough	of	the	vices	of	culture	and	civilization	(the	most	offensive	of	all)	to	make	us	rather	turn	our	eyes	away	from	the	doings	of	human	beings”	(R,	6:	33).	Kant’s	list	of	the	evils	of	civilisation	overlaps	with	that	of	Marx,	as	does	his	denunciation	of	the	“splendid	misery”	and	“inequality	among	people”	,	and	his	critique	of	commercial	societies	whereby	“the	majority	provides	the	necessities	of	life	[…]	for	the	comfort	and	ease	of	others	[…]	and	are	maintained	by	the	latter	in	a	state	of	oppression,	bitter	work	and	little	enjoyment”	(CJ,	5:	432,	for	more	discussion	on	this	point	see	also	Ypi	2014).	He	further	argues	that	“ambition,	love	of	power,	and	greed,	especially	on	 the	part	of	 those	who	are	 in	power”	 render	war,	 as	 a	 condition	directly	
																																																						6	 Immanuel	Kant,	Critique	 of	 the	 Power	 of	 Judgment,	 ed.	 Paul	 Guyer	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	University	Press,	[1793]	2000)	298.,	5:	431,	hereafter	CJ.	
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antithetic	to	human	emancipation	“almost	inevitable”	(CJ,	5:	432).	They	seem	to	condemn	to	the	status	of	“mere	phantasy”	both	the	“philosophical	chiliasm,	which	hopes	for	a	state	of	 perpetual	 peace”	 as	much	 as	 “theological	 chiliasm,	which	 awaits	 for	 the	 completed	moral	improvement	of	the	human	race”	(R,	6:	34).			 For	 Kant,	 the	 kind	 of	 the	 will	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 actively	 fought	 on	 the	 way	 to	realising	human	emancipation	is	human	made.	It	results	from	the	propensity	to	evil	that	vitiates	 humans’	 power	 of	 choice	 and	 is	 evident	 in	 the	 institutions	 and	practices	 that	shape	human	lives	and	which	also	require	radical	reshaping.	We	saw	that	for	Marx,	taking	up	 the	categorical	 imperative	 implicit	 in	 the	German	philosophical	 critique	of	 religion	demanded	 of	 human	 beings	 that	 they	 “overthrow	 all	 circumstances	 in	 which	man	 is	humiliated,	 enslaved,	 abandoned,	 and	 despised”	 (Marx	 1844:	 77).	 The	 difference	between	good	and	evil	does	not	lie	in	the	difference	between	the	incentives	that	human	beings	incorporate	in	their	maxims	but	in	how	they	are	subordinated	to	each	other,	or	to	put	it	with	Kant	in	which	of	the	two	the	human	being	“makes	the	condition	of	the	other”	(R,	6:	36).	But	 if	domination	is	reflected	in	the	adoption	of	a	maxim	contrary	to	moral	purposes,	it	is	also	clear	that	domination	does	not	annihilate	the	power	of	the	moral	law.	Indeed,	even	the	worst	human	being,	Kant	argues,	“does	not	repudiate	the	moral	law	in	rebellious	attitude	to	it”	(R,	6:	35).	This	is	also	why	fighting	evil	is	a	historical	duty	of	the	human	species.	Since	evil	is	found	in	human	beings	as	acting	freely,	Kant	argues,	it	must	equally	be	possible	for	them	to	outweigh	it	through	our	actions	(muß	es	zu	überwiegen	
möglich	sein)	(R,	6:	37).		 Of	course,	Kant	also	emphasises	that	in	addition	to	being	imputable,	evil	is	radical,	and	in	that	sense	perhaps	one	cannot	hope	to	fully	extirpate	it	(R,	6:	37).	His	stance	here	is	 different	 from	 that	 of	Marx,	 and	his	 conception	of	 the	human	will	 in	 its	 relation	 to	external	circumstances	more	pessimistic.	Marx	is	not	interested	in	the	metaphysics	of	evil	and	its	relation	to	free	will	but	in	the	critique	of	modern	commercial	societies	and	of	the	corruption,	 selfishness	and	cruelty	associated	with	 the	 inequalities	 they	generate.	Yet,	domination	in	his	case	too	is	human	made	and	constitutes	a	main	hindrance	to	freedom.	As	in	the	case	of	Kant,	hindrances	to	freedom	become	transparent	through	the	analysis	of	the	social	 institutions	and	practices	that	shape	human	co-existence	and	constitute	a	main	source	of	political	upheaval	and	social	conflict.	Interesting	to	emphasise	here	is	the	relation	between	that	diagnosis	and	the	role	of	human	freedom	in	Marx’s	analysis	of	the	development	of	the	human	species.	Central	to	that	account	is	a	certain	interpretation	of	
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the	tension	between	the	moral	potential	of	the	human	species	and	the	historical	obstacles	preventing	 the	 realisation	of	 that	potential.	We	 saw	 that	 for	Kant	 the	human	being	 is	entitled	 to	 be	 considered	 an	 ultimate	 end	 of	 nature	 on	 condition	 that	 it	 has	 “the	understanding	and	the	will	to	give	to	nature	and	to	himself	a	relation	to	an	end	that	can	be	sufficient	for	itself	independently	of	nature”	(CJ,	5:	431).	What	hinders	that	potential	is	the	way	in	which	human	beings	end	up	choosing	selfish	or	corrupt	maxims	over	moral	ones	 in	 virtue	 of	 self-love,	 or	 as	 a	 result	 of	 practices	 and	habits	 that	 encourage	 envy,	corruption,	inequality	and	thirst	for	power.		For	Marx	too,	the	freedom	of	the	human	species	consists	in	the	ability	of	human	beings	to	subordinate	nature	and	to	set	ends	for	themselves.	As	he	puts	it,	contrasting	animals	and	human	beings	“the	animal	is	immediately	one	with	its	vital	activity.	It	is	not	distinct	from	it”.	But	the	human	being,	on	the	other	hand,	“makes	his	vital	activity	itself	into	an	object	of	his	will	and	consciousness.”	This	is	exactly	what	singles	him	out	as	“a	species-being”,	not	merely	the	ability	to	use	means	for	ends	in	general	but	especially	the	relation	to	“himself	as	to	the	present,	living	species”,	the	relation	to	itself	as	“a	universal	and	therefore	free	being”	(Marx	1844/1932:	89).	An	animal,	Marx	argues,	“produces	only	under	 the	 pressure	 of	 immediate	 physical	 need,	 whereas	 man	 produces	 freely	 from	physical	need	and	only	truly	produces	when	he	is	thus	free”	(Marx	1844/1932:	90).	This	changes	the	perception	of	oneself	and	of	other	members	of	the	human	species,	human’s	self-conscious	perception	of	themselves.	What	singles	out	the	human	species	is	its	ability	to	relate	to	ends	in	general	in	a	way	that	is	not	determined	by	natural	constraints.	It	is	through	 this	 relation	 that	 the	 unique	 freedom	 of	 human	 beings	 in	 choosing	 ends	independently	 from	 nature	 is	 manifested.	 To	 put	 it	 with	Marx,	 “man	makes	 his	 vital	activity	itself	into	an	object	of	his	will	and	consciousness”	(Marx	1844/1933:	89).	This	ability	to	make	one’s	own	life	the	object	of	one’s	own	will	and	knowledge	is	what	singles	out	a	species	being	from	merely	animal	activity.	It	is	“the	only	reason	for	his	activity	being	free	activity”	(Marx	1844/1933:	89).	Central	to	Marx’s	analysis	is	here	the	gap	between	the	potential	recognition	of	the	species	being	in	human	activity	and	the	historical	distortion	of	this	potential	as	a	result	of	 particular	 social	 practices	 and	 human	 decisions.	 Marx’s	 critique	 of	 commercial	societies	in	the	Economic	and	Philosophical	Manuscripts	is	intended	to	illustrate	precisely	how	the	 freedom	of	human	beings	as	species	beings	 is	perverted	 in	 the	way	 in	which	labour	relations	under	capitalist	conditions	of	production	corrupt	human	beings’	relation	
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to	ends	in	general	and	to	each	other	as	ends	in	themselves.	Marx’s	category	of	alienated	labour	picks	up	on	the	gap	between	human	potential	and	human	reality	when	it	comes	to	the	background	constraints	informing	the	selection	of	ends	in	general	(or,	to	put	it	with	Kant,	the	adoption	of	maxims	for	action)	and	to	the	recognition	of	these	ends	as	a	result	of	 free	choice.	Alienated	 labour	appears	when	the	worker	relates	 to	 the	product	of	his	
labour	as	to	an	alien	object.	Alienated	labour	is	the	kind	of	labour	that	creates	a	world	that	the	worker	does	not	recognise	as	one	of	his	own	making.7	The	more,	Marx	says,	“the	worker	exerts	himself	in	his	work,	the	more	powerful	the	alien,	objective	world	becomes	which	 he	 brings	 into	 being	 over	 against	 himself,	 the	 poorer	 he	 and	 his	 inner	 world	become,	 and	 the	 less	 they	 belong	 to	 him”	 (Marx	 1844/1932:	 89).	 Alienated	 labour	 is	labour	directed	to	the	mere	satisfaction	of	one’s	needs	which	thereby	degrades	“man’s	own	 free	 activity	 to	 a	means”	 and	 turns	 “the	 species-life	 of	man	 into	 a	means	 for	 his	physical	 existence”	 (Marx	 1844/1932:	 91).	While	 the	 free	 activity	 of	 a	 species	 being	consists	in	the	subjection	of	the	external	world	to	human	beings’	will	and	consciousness,	alienated	labour	“reverses	the	relationship	so	that,	just	because	he	is	a	conscious	being,	man	 makes	 his	 vital	 activity	 and	 essence	 a	 mere	 means	 to	 his	 existence”	 (Marx	1844/1932:	90).			 Therefore,	 for	both	Kant	and	Marx,	 the	prime	obstacle	 to	human	emancipation	consists	in	hindrances	to	the	free	development	of	the	human	beings,	understood	as	the	ability	to	set	and	pursue	ends	independently	of	nature	and	in	conformity	with	their	own	intelligence	and	good	will.	This	obstacle	is	human	made,	it	is	emphatically	not	due	to	the	effects	of	natural	inclinations.	Propensity	to	evil,	Kant	emphasises,	“can	only	attach	to	the	moral	faculty	of	choice”	(R,	6:	31).	To	understand	the	way,	it	hinders	free	human	agency,	we	need	to	analyse	the	relation	of	human	will	to	the	external	world,	and	the	background	conditions	 under	 which	 certain	 decisions	 are	 taken.	 For	 Kant,	 the	 analysis	 of	 such	background	conditions	takes	the	form	of	an	exploration	of	humans’	“propensity	for	evil”	where	“propensity”	indicates	“the	subjective	ground	of	the	possibility	of	an	inclination	(habitual	 desire,	 concupiscentia)	 in	 so	 far	 as	 this	 predisposition	 is	 contingent	 for	humanity	in	general”	(R,	6:	29).	Such	propensity	comes	in	degrees,	it	can	be	explained	as	frailty	of	human	will,	 impurity	 in	the	pursuit	of	moral	goals,	or	depravity	 in	the	active	perversion	of	their	course	(R,	6:	29).	And	yet,	all	of	this,	Kant	insists,	afflicts	human	beings	
																																																						7	For	further	discussion	of	this	point	and	some	important	parallels	with	Kant’s	theory	see	also	Rainer	Forst’s	discussion	of	alienation	in	this	issue.	
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to	the	extent	that	they	live	in	association	with	each	other:	“they	do	not	come	his	way	from	his	own	raw	nature,	so	far	as	he	exists	in	isolation”,	but	rather	from	the	comparison	with	other	human	beings	“to	whom	he	stands	in	relations	of	association”	(R,	6:	93).	The	human	being	is	poor,	Kant	argues,	in	Rouseauian	fashion,	“only	to	the	extent	that	other	human	beings	will	consider	him	poor	and	will	despise	him	for	it”	(Ibid.).	Civil	society	is	the	social	condition	 in	which	 “envy,	 addiction	 to	 power,	 avarice,	 and	 the	malignant	 inclinations	associated	with	these	assail	his	nature,	which	on	its	own	is	undemanding,	as	soon	as	he	is	
with	other	human	beings”	(Ibid.).8		For	Marx,	the	analysis	goes	much	further	and	takes	the	form	of	an	exploration	of	the	more	specific	social	conditions	under	which	these	dispositions	thrive.	Competition	for	resources,	the	desire	for	profit,	the	accumulation	of	power,	the	analysis	of	the	drive	to	realise	 certain	 human	 inclinations	 are	 all	 the	 evils	 associated	 to	 the	 triumph	 of	 civil	society	in	modern	social	conditions	and	pervert	the	moral	purpose	of	human	beings	as	species	being.	As	Marx	puts	 it,	 the	 “sum	of	productive	 forces,	 capital	 funds,	and	social	forms	 of	 intercourse,	 which	 every	 individual	 and	 generation	 finds	 in	 existence	 as	something	given,	is	the	real	basis	of	what	the	philosophers	have	conceived	as	‘substance’	and	‘essence	of	man’,	and	what	they	have	deified	and	attacked”	(Marx	1844/1932:	189).	As	we	can	see,	the	discussion	of	the	relation	between	morality	and	society	is	here	rather	different,	 for	Kant	the	issue	is	one	of	the	will’s	radical	“propensity	to	evil”,	while	Marx	focuses	on	alienation	as	 a	 condition	of	modernity.	Yet,	 in	both	 cases	 the	analysis	also	reveals	how	the	free	pursuit	of	moral	ends	is	hindered	by	immoral	human	choices	and	ways	of	organising	human	relations	which	actively	obstruct	or	pervert	their	course.	And	yet,	because	the	obstacle	to	human	emancipation	is	in	both	Kant	and	Marx	dependent	on	human	 agency,	 the	 kind	 of	 hindrance	 to	 freedom	 that	 both	 emphasise	 is	 in	 principle	possible	to	tame	(in	the	case	of	Kant)	and	overcome	(in	the	case	of	Marx).	And	in	both	cases,	 the	way	 to	achieve	 these	emancipatory	goals	 is	 through	active	struggle	and	 the	creation	of	an	ethical	community,	cosmopolitan	in	scope,	anchored	in	political	change	(if	not	entirely	reducible	to	it)	and	understood	as	a	collective	historical	enterprise	through	which	human	attitudes	 and	dispositions	 are	 revolutionised.	The	next	 section	 explains	how.			 	
																																																						8	For	more	discussion	of	these	points,	see	also	Wood	1998	and	Ypi	2010.	
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	4.	“The	Kingdom	of	God	is	come	into	us”		The	 previous	 sections	 emphasised	 how	 Kant	 and	 Marx	 both	 reject	 institutionalised	religion	in	the	name	of	a	radical	understanding	of	the	human	species	as	essentially	free	and	in	control	of	its	fate,	without	a	need	for	external	masters	to	determine	its	course	of	action.	They	both	however	also	insist	that	human	beings	are	equally	prone	to	applying	their	capacity	for	choice	to	the	pursuit	of	immoral	ends,	thus	perverting	the	development	of	free	agency	and	obstructing	the	full	development	of	the	species-being	(or,	for	Kant,	the	realisation	of	the	highest	good	in	the	world).	Therefore,	for	both	the	main	challenge	of	human	 emancipation	 is	 to	 narrow	 the	 gap	 between	 what	 human	 beings	 are	 under	particular	social	circumstances	and	what	they	ought	to	be.	But	how	can	those	who	are	prone	to	this	perversion	also	be	in	charge	of	remedying	it?	If	human	beings	are	alienated,	how	can	they	overcome	alienation?		As	Kant	famously	put	it,	“how	can	an	evil	tree	bear	good	fruit”?	(R,	6:	45).		For	Kant,	the	answer	lies	in	the	fact	that	since	the	human	being	is	in	the	current	condition	through	his	own	fault,	“he	is	bound	at	least	to	apply	as	much	force	as	he	can	muster	in	order	to	extricate	himself	from	it”	(R,	6:	93).	But	since	the	obstacle	becomes	particularly	 intractable	when	human	beings	 find	 themselves	 living	 in	association	with	others,	the	solution	will	also	have	to	be	a	collective	one,	or	else	the	human	species	will	constantly	be	in	danger	of	a	relapse.	As	Kant	puts	it,	to	exit	a	condition	in	which	the	evil	maxim	prevails	over	the	good	one,	a	collective	effort	 is	required,	one	that	 leads	to	the	establishment	of	“a	union	which	has	 for	 its	end	the	prevention	of	 this	evil”	and	which	forms	“an	enduring	and	ever-expanding	society,	solely	designed	for	the	preservation	of	morality	by	counteracting	evil	with	moral	forces”	(ibid.).		For	Marx,	the	emphasis	on	the	power	of	critique,	the	theoretical	insistence	on	the	capacity	of	humans,	in	principle,	to	break	free	from	their	condition	of	dependence	is,	also	not	 enough:	 “The	 weapon	 of	 criticism	 cannot,	 of	 course,	 supplant	 the	 criticism	 of	weapons;	material	force	must	be	overthrown	by	material	force”.	But	interestingly,	Marx	also	insists	that	theory	too	“as	soon	as	it	seizes	the	masses”	will	“become	material	force”	(Marx	1844:	77).	There	are	important	affinities	here	with	Kant’s	analysis	of	virtue	which	has	an	active	component,	a	component	that	contains	the	ground	for	struggling	against	evil	and	that	requires	the	concerted	efforts	of	all	human	beings	to	rally	under	the	banner	of	virtue	“so	that	they	may	congregate	under	it	and	thus	at	the	very	start	gain	the	upper	
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hand	over	evil	and	its	untiring	attacks”	(R,	6:	94).	As	Kant	puts	it,	“to	become	a	morally	good	human	being	 is	not	enough	 to	simply	 let	 the	germ	of	 the	good	which	 lies	 in	our	species	develop	unhindered;	there	is	in	us	an	active	and	opposing	cause	of	evil	which	is	also	to	be	combatted”	(R,	6:	57).9	For	Kant,	the	kind	of	community	responsible	for	promoting	a	collective	struggle	against	domination	by	the	evil	principle	is	“an	ethical	community”,	and	in	so	far	as	the	principles	 to	which	 it	asks	human	beings	 to	subscribe	are	public	and	take	the	 form	of	“laws	of	virtue”	it	can	be	called	“an	ethical	state”.	An	ethical	state	has	important	analogies	with	a	political	state.	Firstly,	just	like	the	political	state,	it	is	grounded	on	the	necessity	to	overcome	 the	 (ethical)	 state	 of	 nature,	 a	 condition	 under	 which	 “each	 individual	prescribes	the	law	to	himself,	and	there	is	no	external	law	to	which	he,	along	with	the	others	acknowledges	himself	to	be	subject”	(R,	6:	95).	Secondly,	just	as	with	the	political	state,	 the	necessity	of	an	ethical	 state	 is	 triggered	by	 the	 recognition	of	 the	perceived	insufficiency	of	individual	efforts	alone	in	their	struggle	against	domination,	and	the	need	for	coordination	and	continuity	to	collectively	support	such	efforts.	Thirdly,	just	as	in	the	case	of	the	political	state	of	nature,	it	is	a	duty	of	human	beings	to	abandon	that	condition	and	join	a	juridical	community,	in	the	case	of	the	ethical	community	it	is	a	duty	to	become	member	of	a	community	that	enacts	laws	of	virtue.10		But	 there	 are	 also	 important	 differences.	 The	 first	 concerns	 the	 justification	of	coercion.	 While	 a	 political	 community	 uses	 coercion	 to	 ensure	 compliance,	 it	 would	contradict	ethical	ends	to	compel	citizens	to	join	an	ethical	community,	“since	the	latter	entails	freedom	from	coercion	in	its	very	concept”	(R,	6:	95).	Secondly,	while	a	political	community	requires	a	sovereign	legislator	(Gesetzgeber)	whose	executive	power	reflects	the	supreme	legislative	authority	of	the	people	united	in	a	political	commonwealth,	an	ethical	community	relies	on	the	idea	of	“someone	other	than	the	people”	i.e.	on	the	idea	of	God	as	 the	“supreme	 lawgiver	of	an	ethical	community”	 (oberster	Gesetzgeber	eines	
ethischen	gemeinen	Wesens)	or	“moral	ruler	of	the	world”	(moralischen	Weltherrscher)	(R,	6:	99).	Thirdly,	there	is	a	difference	in	scope.	A	political	community	is	always	a	partial	society	with	a	particular	location	and	circumscribed	jurisdiction.	On	the	other	hand,	since	
																																																						9	Note	the	translation	mistake	(or	typo)	in	the	Cambridge	edition	where	‘the	germ	of	the	good”(Keim	des	
Gutes)	is	rendered	as	“the	germ	of	god”	(R,	6:	57).	10	Obviously	my	 interpretation	here	 emphasizes	 the	 secular	nature	 of	 ethical	 community	within	Kant’s	
Religion.	While	that	interpretation	is	contested	(see	Palmquist	2009	and	Pasternack	2017	for	critiques),	I	am	not	alone	in	holding	it.	For	secular	reconstructions	to	which	I	am	sympathetic,	see	(Reath	1988:	606-7	and	Wood	2000).	
	 16	
“the	duties	of	virtue	concern	the	entire	human	race,	the	concept	of	an	ethical	community	always	refers	to	the	idea	of	a	totality	of	human	beings,	and	in	this	it	distinguishes	itself	from	a	political	community”	(Ibid.).	This	implies	that	any	particular	multitude	of	human	beings	 united	 to	 promote	 an	 ethical	 community	 cannot	 yet	 be	 called	 an	 ethical	community.	It	is	rather	only	“a	particular	society	that	strives	after	the	consensus	of	all	human	beings	(and,	indeed	of	all	finite	rational	beings)	in	order	to	establish	an	absolute	ethical	whole	of	which	 each	partial	 society	 is	 only	 a	 representation	or	 schema”	 (R,	 6:	96).11	 A	 complete	 ethical	 community	 is	 therefore	 an	 ideal	 of	 reason,	 an	 ideal	 for	 the	realisation	of	which	 it	 is	 a	 duty	 to	work	 and	which	 falls	 on	 the	 entire	 human	 species	collectively	and	cumulatively.		The	analysis	of	the	parallels	between	political	and	ethical	community	shows	that	for	Kant	political	emancipation	is	a	first	step	towards	moral	human	emancipation,	it	does	not	 exhaust	 it.	 This	 points	 to	 an	 interesting	 relation	 between	 juridical	 and	 ethical	community	and	to	a	distinctive	analysis	of	the	role	of	external	coercion	in	bringing	about	complete	human	emancipation.	 Juridical	and	ethical	emancipation	do	not	oppose	each	other,	 rather	 the	 first	 is	 a	 precondition	 for	 the	 latter.	 As	 Kant	 puts	 it,	 without	 the	foundation	of	a	political	community,	an	ethical	community	“could	never	be	brought	into	existence	by	human	beings”	(R,	6:	94).	But	it	is	important	to	notice	that	while	a	political	community	supports	the	creation	of	an	ethical	community,	 it	can	never	fully	realise	 it.	The	realisation	of	an	ethical	community	requires	a	fundamental	transformation	in	human	dispositions,	 a	 transformation	 that	 never	 be	 brought	 about	 merely	 through	 state	coercion.	A	“new	man”,	Kant	argues	with	a	reference	to	Genesis,	can	“come	about	only	through	a	kind	of	rebirth”	and	“a	change	of	heart”	(R,	6:	47).	This	requires	a	process	of	“moral	 education”	 which	 can	 only	 be	 consolidated	 by	 following	 the	 lead	 given	 by	examples	of	good	moral	behaviour	and	by	enabling	virtue	to	become	a	habit	“so	that	duty	merely	for	itself	beings	to	acquire	in	the	apprentices	heart	a	noticeable	importance”	(R,	6:	48).	And	even	with	all	this,	freedom	is	never	fully	asserted,	it	remains	“constantly	under	attack”	by	the	evil	principle	and	the	human	being	must	remain	“forever	armed	for	battle”	(R,	6:	93).	There	 are	 some	 interesting	 affinities	 between	 Kant’s	 and	Marx’s	 views	 on	 the	relation	between	political	emancipation	and	human	(moral)	emancipation.	For	Marx	too,	
																																																						11	On	the	relation	between	schema	and	ideal	of	reason,	see	Ypi	(manuscript	under	contract).	
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freedom	 from	 domination	 cannot	 be	 achieved	 only	 through	 political	means,	 however	indispensable	 the	 latter	may	be.	While	 reforming	 the	state	 is	necessary	 to	 initiate	 the	process	 of	 human	 emancipation,	 the	 kind	 of	 revolution	 in	 disposition	 required	 to	complete	that	process	and	realise	a	society	in	which	“the	free	development	of	each	is	a	condition	 of	 the	 free	 development	 of	 all”	 is	 one	 that	 no	 coercive	 institution	 could	accomplish.	As	Marx	puts	it,	“political	emancipation	is	not	the	completed	and	consistent	form	of	human	emancipation”	(Marx	1843:	51).	Indeed,	Marx	argues,	“the	limitations	of	political	emancipation	are	immediately	evident	in	the	fact	that	a	state	can	liberate	itself	from	a	limitation	without	man	himself	being	truly	free	of	it”	(Ibid.).	This	is	because,	Marx	argues,	“when	man	liberates	himself	politically,	he	liberates	himself	by	means	of	a	detour,	through	the	medium	of	something	else,	however	necessary	that	medium	may	be”.12	Thus,	just	as	for	Kant	political	emancipation	and	human	emancipation	are	not	reducible	to	each	other,	 for	 Marx	 too	 political	 emancipation	 is	 only	 a	 step	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 human	emancipation.	 “Political	 emancipation”,	 Marx	 argues,	 “is	 of	 course	 a	 great	 progress.	Although	it	is	not	the	final	form	of	human	emancipation	in	general,	it	is	nevertheless	the	final	form	of	human	emancipation	inside	the	present	world	order”	(Ibid.).	In	talking	about	the	kind	of	change	required	to	control	the	human	propensity	to	evil,	 Kant	 explains	why	 political	 reform	 is	 necessary	 but	 insufficient	 to	 complete	 the	process	of	human	emancipation	by	 referring	 to	 the	 importance	of	 a	 change	 in	human	attitudes	which	no	political	revolution	could	deliver.	As	he	puts	it	“that	a	human	being	should	become	not	merely	legally	good	but	morally	good	…	cannot	be	effected	through	gradual	reform	but	must	be	effected	through	a	revolution	in	the	disposition	of	the	human	being”	 (R,	 6:	 47).	 Marx	 cites	 Rousseau	 in	 arguing	 for	 how	 political	 emancipation	 is	insufficient	to	achieve	a	similar	revolution:	“He	who	dares	to	undertake	the	making	of	a	people’s	institutions	ought	to	feel	himself	capable,	so	to	speak,	of	changing	human	nature,	of	 transforming	 each	 individual	 […]	 of	 altering	man’s	 constitution	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	strengthening	it”	(Marx	1843:	64).	This	in	turn	requires	“to	take	away	from	man	his	own	resources	and	give	him	instead	new	ones,	alien	to	him”	and	“in	the	course	of	this	process	the	 individual	human	being	becomes	a	 species	being,	he	 recognises	his	own	 forces	as	social	 forces	 and	 organizes	 them”	 (Ibid.).	 Only	 when	 this	 has	 been	 achieved,	 Marx	emphasises,	will	human	emancipation	be	completed.	
																																																						12	Ibid.	
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For	Kant,	once	this	process	begins	to	take	hold,	it	becomes	plausible	to	say	that	“the	Kingdom	of	God	is	come	into	us”	even	if	it	means	that	only	the	principle	of	gradual	transition	to	“a	divine	ethical	state	on	earth”	has	put	it	roots	“universally	and	somewhere	also	in	public”.	For	this	beginning	also	contains	“the	basis	for	a	continual	approximation	to	 the	ultimate	perfection”	 (R,	6:	122).	The	somewhere	 (irgendwo)	mentioned	by	Kant	here	 is	 of	 course	 a	 specific	 place	 on	 earth,	 and	 the	 not-so-veiled	 reference	 to	revolutionary	France	and	the	role	it	played	in	rendering	the	enlightened	European	public	aware	of	the	active	struggle	against	domination,	confirms	Kant’s	subsequent	remarks	on	the	increasing	obsolescence	of	ecclesiastical	faith	and	religious	institutions	to	sustain	the	pure	 religion	 of	 reason.13	 For	 Kant,	 “in	 the	 end	 religion	will	 be	 freed	 of	 all	 empirical	grounds	of	determination,	 of	 all	 statutes	 that	 rest	 on	history	 and	unite	human	beings	provisionally	for	the	promotion	of	the	good”	(R:	6,	122).	Here,	“at	last	the	pure	faith	of	religion	will	rule	over	all	so	that	“God	may	be	all	in	all”	through	a	gradual	transition	from	“ecclesiastical	faith	to	the	universal	religion	of	reason”	(Ibid.).		For	Marx,	the	universal	religion	of	reason	that	Kant	emphasises	in	these	passages	is	embodied	in	the	utopia	of	communism,	an	ideal	society	that	 is	thoroughly	inclusive,	universal	 in	 scope,	and	 that	no	 longer	needs	coercion	 to	 realise	human	emancipation.	Communism	 represents	 an	 ideal	 of	 mutual	 cooperation	 that	 transcends	 the	 need	 for	juridical	enforcement	by	the	state	and	that	progressively	promotes	the	transition	to	what	Kant	calls	a	divine	ethical	state	on	earth.		As	Marx	puts	it,	“once	the	essential	reality	of	man	 in	 nature,	 man	 as	 the	 existence	 of	 nature	 for	 man,	 and	 nature	 for	 man	 as	 the	existence	of	man,	has	become	evident	[…]	then	the	question	of	an	alien	being,	of	a	being	above	nature	and	man—a	question	that	implies	an	admission	of	the	unreality	of	nature	and	man—has	become	impossible	in	practice”	(Marx	1844:	104).	Religion	is	as	such	not	actively	abolished,	it	progressively	becomes	irrelevant.	With	it	the	active	opposition	to	religion	in	the	form	of	atheism	progressively	loses	its	meaning.	Atheism,	Marx	argues,	“is	a	 denial	 of	 God	 and	 tries	 to	 assert	 through	 this	 negation	 the	 existence	 of	 man;	 but	socialism	as	such	no	longer	needs	this	mediation	[…]	it	is	the	positive	self-consciousness	of	man	no	longer	mediated	through	the	negation	of	religion”	(Marx	1844:	104).		Kant	clearly	does	not	go	as	far	as	Marx	in	emphasising	the	complete	supersession	of	 the	 need	 for	 religious	 faith	 and	 with	 it	 of	 an	 invisible	 church	 reinforcing	 ethical	
																																																						13	For	a	discussion	of	the	relation	between	Kant’s	account	of	the	French	revolution	and	the	development	of	moral	dispositions,	see	Ypi	2014.		
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community.	 Yet	 he	 also	 insists	 that	 once	 the	 principle	 of	 transition	 to	 the	 universal	religion	of	reason	has	planted	its	seeds,	external	religious	authorities	no	longer	support	but	hinder	its	development.	“The	leading-string	of	holy	tradition,	with	its	appendages,	its	statutes	 and	 observances,	 which	 in	 its	 time	 did	 good	 service,	 become	 bit	 by	 bit	dispensable,	yea,	finally,	when	a	human	being	enters	upon	his	adolescence,	turn	into	a	fetter”	(R,	6:	122).	Equality,	Kant	argues,	“springs	from	true	freedom,	yet	without	anarchy,	for	each	indeed	obeys	the	law	(not	the	statutory	one)	which	has	prescribed	for	himself”.	Such	is	the	result	not	of	an	external	revolution,	but	of	the	workings	of	“the	principle	of	the	pure	religion	of	reason”	as	embedded	in	their	ethical	community,	which	contains	the	seed	that	“will	one	day	enlighten	the	world	and	rule	over	it”	(Ibid.).14	Marx	radicalises	this	position	in	light	of	the	change	in	the	political	conditions	of	Germany	as	well	as	his	own	distinctive	critique	of	European	commercial	societies	and	more	specific	emphasis	on	capitalist	 social	 relations.	 Once	 the	 political	 revolution	 is	 completed,	 the	 ensuing	revolution	 in	 ethical	 attitudes	 entails	 that	 a	 progressive	 community	 no	 longer	 needs	religion	to	achieve	human	emancipation.	It	also	does	not	actively	seek	to	abolish	it,	rather	it	can	afford	to	abstract	from	it	“because	it	realises	the	human	foundations	of	religion	in	a	secular	manner”	(1844:	104).			
Conclusion	
	Kant’s	and	Marx’s	treatments	of	religion	are	of	course	very	different:	in	relation	to	their	historical	 context,	 in	 style,	 content,	 purpose	 and	 argumentation.	 The	 reading	 I	 have	offered	is	clearly	very	selective,	no	doubt	countless	passages	can	be	found	to	support	an	interpretation	very	different	from	my	own.	Kant’s	audience	was	primarily	academic	and	the	 style	 intentionally	 dry	 and	 abstract,	 perhaps,	 given	 the	 difficulties	 with	 Prussian	censors,	even	more	so	in	his	writings	on	religion	than	elsewhere.	Marx’s	audience	was	not	academic	at	all,	his	reflections	on	religion	are	much	more	scattered	and	unsystematic,	and	often	appear	in	the	context	of	criticism	of	his	interlocutors	or	attacks	to	his	political	adversaries	rather	than	in	an	attempt	to	offer	sustained	philosophical	argument.	Yet,	as	I	tried	to	suggest	in	this	paper,	some	common	themes	animate	the	reflection	of	each.	Both	
																																																						14	For	the	importance	of	the	critique	of	religious	authority	at	this	point,	see	also	Wood	(1999:	318.	
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start	with	the	fact	of	freedom	as	distinguishing	human	beings	from	all	other	species,	both	are	concerned	with	the	gap	between	the	potential	and	the	reality	of	human	emancipation,	both	reflect	on	the	social	nature	of	obstacles	to	humanity’s	improvement.	And	when	it	comes	to	the	answers	offered,	there	are	also	some	important	affinities.	For	both	Kant	and	Marx	the	duty	to	achieve	human	emancipation	is	a	collective	historical	one.	For	both,	such	a	duty	relies	on	political	emancipation	but	is	not	reducible	to	it.	And	in	both	cases,	the	necessity	 of	 ethical	 community	 has	 to	 do	 with	 the	 need	 to	 transform,	 indeed,	revolutionise	humans’	attitude	and	mode	of	 thinking	so	as	 to	no	 longer	need	external	authorities	 but	 only	 the	 purity	 of	 one’s	 intentions	 to	 achieve	 moral	 progress.	 Marx	radicalises	Kant’s	message:	the	latter’s	analysis	of	the	innate	human	beings’	propensity	to	evil	is	an	instance	of	alienation	under	particular	social	and	political	conditions.	Yet	in	both	cases	what	matters	from	a	moral	point	of	view	is	the	perversion	of	the	vocation	of	the	human	species	due	to	the	selfish	and	corrupt	nature	of	particular	social	relations	(the	unsocial	 sociability	on	which	commercial	 societies	 thrive).	The	answer	 for	Kant	 is	 the	foundation	of	an	ethical	community	through	an	invisible	church	that	aspires	to	sustain	the	fight	against	the	propensity	to	evil	even	if	one	is	never	guaranteed	to	overcome	it.	For	Marx,	it	is	a	much	directly	political	solution,	the	overthrow	of	capitalist	political	relations	and	 the	 progressive	 withering	 away	 of	 the	 state	 paving	 the	 way	 to	 the	 utopia	 of	 a	communist	 society.	Kant	would	have	puzzled	over	Marx’s	 optimism	at	 this	point,	 and	most	certainly	he	would	have	also	disliked	Marx’s	scepticism	towards	the	state	and	the	related	preference	for	forms	of	radical	direct	democracy	at	the	expense	of	representation.		When	 it	 comes	 to	 their	 respective	 understandings	 of	 politics,	 there	 are	 of	 course	innumerable	 other	 important	 differences	 of	 content,	 and	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	 offer	 a	detailed	analysis	of	such	differences	without	engaging	with	Marx’s	critique	of	capitalism	and	how	it	complements	Kant’s	more	abstract	and	inevitably	one-sided	analysis	of	the	unsociable-sociability	of	commercial	societies.	But	all	that	is	a	story	for	another	time.		
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